Maksudnya beliau saat itu masih belum mengatakan bahwa Allah SWT punya kesemuanya itu, namun beliau menafsirkannya dengan berbagai penafsiran. Periode Ketiga Pada periode ini beliau tidak hanya menetapkan 7 sifat Allah, tetapi semua sifat Allah SWT yang bersumber dari nash-nash yang shahih. Beliau para periode ini menerima bahwa Allah SWT itu benar-benar punya wajah, tangan, kaki, betis dan seterusnya. Aliran mereka adalah polarisasi antara wahyu dan filsafat. Barangkali di masa itu kebutuhan untuk menjawab tantangan aqidah dengan menggunakan akal telah menjadi beban. Karena di masa itu sedang terjadi penerjemahan besar-besaran pemikiran filsafat barat yang materialis dan rasionalis ke dunia Islam.
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They tried to interpret faith in terms of pure thought. They ignored the fact that the basic principles of religion are, by their very nature, incapable of logical demonstration or rational proof. The basic principles of Islam deal with supersensible realities and, as such, they must first be accepted on the authority of revelation. This idea of an abstract, impersonal, absolute God could not appeal to the ordinary Muslims. But such an attitude of blind faith could not be maintained for any length of time.
These theologians who employed Kalamfor the defence of their faith were, therefore, known as the Mutakallimun orthodox theologians. In the beginning this new orthodox theological movement developed privately and secretly. It was at first a gradual unconscious drift. It could not come to the open for fear of public criticism.
Regarding his date of birth there is difference of opinion. After the change he wrote a number of books and ibn Furak says that the number amounted to three hundred. In this book we find he is almost a Zahirite. He had a good number of pupils who passed as famous theologians and who spread and developed his doctrines and dogmas. He had to fight against both the opposing parties. At the other extreme were the orthodox groups, particularly the Zahirites, the Mujassimites anthropomorphists , the Muhaddithin Traditionists , and the Jurists, all of which were wholly opposed to the use of reason or Kalamin defending or explaining religious dogmas and condemned any discussion about them as innovation.
In that treatise he says: "A section of the people i. They said that had such discussions been the right thing, the Prophet and his Companions would have definitely done so; they further pointed out that the Prophet, before his death, discussed and fully explained all those matters which were necessary from the religious point of view, leaving none of them to be discussed by his followers; and since he did not discuss the problems mentioned above, it was evident that to discuss them must be regarded as an innovation.
If they knew them and yet did not discuss them, we are also to follow them in keeping silent, and if they could remain unaware of them we can also do so. He tries to meet these objections in three ways. First, by turning the objections of the orthodox against themselves by pointing out to them that the Prophet had not said that those who would discuss these problems were to be condemned and charged as innovators.
Secondly, "the Prophet was not unaware of all these problems of body, accident, motion, rest, atoms, etc. He possesses attributes such as knowledge, power, life, will; He is hearing and seeing and has speech.
He does not possess any attributes apart from His essence. His essence is, for instance, knowing, powerful, seeing, willing, etc. They denied the attributes of God as anything other than and addition to His essence. The extreme Sifatis asserted that even those attributes of God which imply His bodily existence are also to be taken in their true literal sense.
They are to be believed in bila kaifa, without asking "how," and bila tashbih, without drawing any comparison. This doctrine signifies that if any quality or term is applied to God, it must be understood in a unique sense and never taken in the sense in which it is normally used when applied to created beings. God is knowing, for instance, means that God possesses knowledge as an attribute, which is inherent in God, and although it is not exactly the same as His essence, yet it is not something quite different from and other than His essence.
They were between the two horns of a dilemma. They could neither assert the eternal attributes of God to be identical with nor wholly different from the essence of God.
They could not also assert that these eternal attributes are something absolutely different, or other than and separate, from God, as that would lead to multiplicity of eternals, and go against divine unity.
They, therefore, maintained that these attributes are, in one sense, included in and, in another sense, excluded from, the essence of God. So far as their meaning is concerned, the attributes and the essence of God are not the same and as such the attributes are in addition to the essence of God, i. The meaning of dhat essence is different from the meanings of different attributes.
What is true in the case of a created being must also be true in the case of the Divine Being. On the same analogy, distinction must be drawn between the essence of God and His attributes.
The essence and the attributes should not be supposed to be blended in the Divine Being. But this analogical reasoning is very weak, for what is true of a finite being need not necessarily be true of an infinite being.
For instance, God is merciful rahim and also revengeful qahhar ; both the contradictory attributes would constitute the essence of God, which is one, unique, and indivisible ahad , and that is absurd. Hence the divine attributes cannot be identical with the divine essence. The meanings of knowing, willing, and living, for instance, will be exactly the same, and thus knowledge will mean power, or power will mean life, and so on.
His essence is one and He possesses many attributes which eternally inhere in Him and, though not identical with His essence, yet they are not absolutely different from His essence. The orthodox people and the Jabrites maintained a pure fatalistic view. Man has no power to produce any action. They made a distinction between creation khalq and acquisition kasb of an action. The original power alone is effective.
Derived power can create nothing. The power possessed by man is given by God and as such it is derived. Man cannot create anything; he cannot initiate work. God creates in man the power and the ability to perform an act. This free choice of man is not effective in producing the action. It is the habit or nature of God to create the action corresponding to the choice and power created by Himself in man. Thus, the action of man is created by God, both as to initiative and as to production or completion.
Man is free only in making the choice between alternatives and also in intending to do the particular action freely chosen: Man, in making this choice and intending to do the act, acquires iktisab either the merit of appreciation and reward from God if he makes the right choice, or the demerit of condemnation and punishment if he makes the wrong choice. The action is the combined effect of the real cause, God, and the choice and intention of man, the acquisitor, the possessor of ineffective power because of its being derived power.
God creates in two ways: either with a locus mahall or without a locus. Human actions are His creation with a locus. Man cannot take the initiative in any matter, nor can he originate any action. But the completion of the act is partially due to his intention: He, thus, acquires the merit or demerit of the action because of his intending to do a good or bad action. Revelation merely confirms what is accepted by reason and, if there be a conflict between the two, reason is to be preferred and revelation must be so interpreted as to be in conformity with the dictates of reason.
Islam is based on certain fundamental principles or concepts which, being suprasensible in nature, are incapable of rational proof. These principles, first, must be believed in on the basis of revelation.
Revelation, thus, is the real basis of the truth and reality of these basic doctrines of Islam. This faith, based on revelation, must be rationalized. Islam as a religion, no doubt, admits the necessity of rationalizing its faith.
But to admit the necessity of rationalizing faith is not to admit pure reason or analytic thought to be the sole source or basis of Islam as a religion.
Reason, no doubt, has the right to judge Islam and its basic principles, but what is to be judged is of such a nature that it cannot submit to the judgment of reason except on its own terms. Reason must, therefore, be subordinated to revelation. The problem of the criterion of good and evil follows as a corollary to the problem of reason and revelation. The problem of good and evil is one of the most controversial problems of Islamic theology.
The truth and moral value of things and human actions must be determined by reason. They contended that moral qualities of good and evil are objective; they are inherent in the very nature of things or actions and as such can be known by reason and decided to be good or bad.
Divine Law makes them good or bad. When we say that a certain thing or action is good or bad for instance, knowledge is good and ignorance is bad , we mean that it is a quality which makes its possessor perfect or implies a defect in him. Whatever is useful or has utility in our experience is good, and the opposite of it is bad.
So whatever is neither useful nor harmful is neither good nor bad. There is no difference of opinion in the above two senses. But good and bad in the second sense may vary from time to time, from individual to individual, and from place to place. In this sense there will be nothing permanently or universally good or bad; what is good to one may be bad to others and vice versa.
This implies that good and evil are subjective and not objective and real. Hence actions are neither good nor bad, but experience or workability would make them so and, therefore, they can be known by reason without the help of revelation. As actions by themselves are neither good nor bad, there is nothing in them which would make them rewardable good or punishable bad. As there is no quality of good or evil seated in the verypature of an act, there can be no question of knowing it by reason.
The Hanbalites and other Zahirites extreme orthodox schools held that the speech of God, i. These meanings are expressed; their expression in language is temporal and created. They further maintained that this meaning is an attribute other than knowledge and will and, as such, inheres eternally in the essence of God and is, therefore, eternal.
Hence it is also eternal and uncreated. The extreme orthodox Muslims and the Zahirites, in particular, held that it is possible to see God and the righteous persons would actually have His vision as the chief reward for their good actions. They further held that God is settled firmly on His Throne, He exists in different directions, and is capable of being pointed out. They accepted the philosophical principle that whatever is extended or spatial must be contingent and temporal, and God is not an extended and temporal being.
This admission landed them into a difficulty, for if God is not extended and only extended things can be seen, God cannot be seen;  but this conclusion conflicts with their position that beatific vision is possible.
So, in order to get out of this difficulty, they asserted the possibility of seeing an object even if it is not present before the perceiver. It is possible to see God even though our sense of vision does not receive the corresponding "impression" of the object on it. Hence, though this impression is missing in the case of seeing God, it may still be called "seeing.
In either case, it should be possible at all times. And if it is possible at all times, it must be possible now; and if it is possible to see Him now, we must see Him now, for when all the conditions of "vision" are present, the actual seeing must take place. Therefore, the consequent, the vision of God, must also be possible.
Some other verses also support the conclusion.
They tried to interpret faith in terms of pure thought. They ignored the fact that the basic principles of religion are, by their very nature, incapable of logical demonstration or rational proof. The basic principles of Islam deal with supersensible realities and, as such, they must first be accepted on the authority of revelation. This idea of an abstract, impersonal, absolute God could not appeal to the ordinary Muslims.
Prinsip Dasar Aqidah Asy'ariyah
Untuk menjawab masalah ini kita harus mengetahui hakikat kelompok ini dan pemikiran-pemikirannya. Benarkah pengakuan mereka? Karena banyak yang mengaku dirinya sebagai Ahlus Sunnah, padahal akidahnya jauh dari akidah Ahlus Sunnah. Oleh karena itu, kita akan mendapatkan penyimpangan mereka dalam ber-istidlal pengambilan dalil. Di antara prinsip mereka yang menyimpang dalam berdalil: 1.